Starting where the rubber hits the road, Chief Commissioner Bush has implemented a Force-wide edict reversing a policy that has not worked and has been persevered with for years without empirical data to support its retention, exacerbated by the current lack of Force numbers.

The Minimum Police Station staffing policy, we suspect, was conceived within the upper echelons of the Force, far removed from the practical, real-world policing issues faced by police daily and the operational variables between one police station and any other.

An adverse byproduct of a bloated bureaucracy and a clear demonstration of why the one-size-fits-all approach is a failure.

Exposing these types of policy decisions gives an insight into the organisational failure that has plagued VicPol for years.

Running the ‘Oh my god’, ‘Close a Police Station?’ is an alarmist mantra that is not helpful without understanding the reality of policing and the history of how this once great organisation has declined due to poor management at the highest level.

The Chiefs’ edict does not necessarily translate into mass Station closures; it is more about moving decision-making to the level that is best equipped, where managers can make sound calls to serve the community better.

The Chief has previously indicated his interest in using former Police to assist the organisation, and the role of manning the public face of a police station could well fall within that concept.

The value of a long-serving experienced police member would not only provide better service delivery but also provide a role model function for junior police at a station.

The Local Area Commander (LAC) is the key person best placed to make resource allocation decisions within their span of control in consultation with Station or Unit Commanders.

The LAC benefits from local knowledge and an understanding of the strengths and weaknesses of the resources under their command.

To be most effective, the move to loosen the bridle on LACs and give them flexibility will undoubtedly come with additional accountability for the performance of the area under their Command. This, in turn, will also require subordinate managers within this structure to take responsibility for the performance and accountability of their units.

Suppose a Police Station is not managing the prevention and detection of crime to the standard set by the LAC for their area of responsibility. In that case, the manager should be mentored and, if necessary, receive additional training. If that fails, they should find an alternative position they are capable of managing.

The same rules should be applied equally to all managers in the hierarchical linear system, including LACs.

Properly implemented, this move will free up managers and their support staff further up the Totem pole to be redeployed as their functions diminish.

The bloated hierarchy resulted from creating and throwing another Command and all the ancillary Command support staff at a problem to fix it, rather than pragmatic management strategies.

Examples of unnecessary Executive Commands, like the four Regional Commands, can be rationalised.

If LACs are working correctly, then one Regional and one metropolitan are all that are required.  State and Emergency Command can be addressed by the regional Commander where the Disaster is occurring.

That alone would free up a large number of Police and support staff, sworn and unsworn, to reallocate to operations and operations support at a Station level.

The Family Violence Command requires a coordination Office only, not a Command, and serious work to identify non-police functions in this space will free up countless police.

There are a myriad of other areas that need severe pruning or reorganisation because subsequent executives lost sight of the Police role – serving the community, not a corporate monolith, and not creating poor justifications for perceived weaknesses in the Force’s performance by establishing more bureaucracy or more Police Quangos.

It seems Bush is on the right track.

Thankfully, the Rotation management system has been largely consigned to the WPB, where it should have always resided. However, the damage caused will linger for years as the generation of officers who were blooded in that process and deprived of a real opportunity to learn and showcase their capabilities move through the system.

Whether many of them can regain their Mojo is, unfortunately, moot.

A serious consideration of reintroducing the prerequisite for all Officers to complete the Officers Training College as a live-in training facility would be a good step, allowing for a course restructuring to train all Officers in the rebuilding of a positive Police culture.

As a live-in course, the students gain insight into their peer’s experiences and develop career-long bonds that will serve them well as they progress. Having the opportunity to evaluate their own capability compared to peers’ develops an essential skill-set for future leadership roles.

Reviewing the approach to Officer Training would equip the Force for the next millennium, producing a modern, capable team of Officers who can apply the Peelian principles in a contemporary environment. A tendency to move training to a more academic, university-style model has not served the Force or the State well.

It would be unrealistic to expect all Officers to embrace the concept of effective policing and its accompanying accountability component, given the conditions they experienced under various flawed management models and the equally flawed application of them.

Additional training would be a very reasonable approach.

Focusing on the LACs first for retraining would hasten the benefits to frontline members, where the need for change is most critical, for their benefit and the community, where improvements in Force service delivery will be felt most keenly.